Energy in the Korean economy by Elliott, V. L. et al.
Number 10
 
ENERGY IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY
 
V.L Elliott and Frank R. Wyant
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1981. The views expressed here were prepared independently

and do not reflect positions of authors' organizations or
 
related agencies, Please do not quote or cite without the
 
permission of the authors.
 
THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
 
The Wilson Center, lecated in the Smithsonian Institution's
 
historic castle building on the Mall in Washington, D.C., is
 
the official memorial to the 28th President of the United
 
States. Chartered by Congress in 1I68, and dedicated by the
 
President in February 1971, the Center offers residential
 
fellowships in the humanities and social sciences 
to scholars
 
and professionals from around the world. 
 It also promotes
 
communication between the world of learning and the world of
 
public affairs through an ongoing series of meetings, seminar!
 
and publications which regularly attract a broad cross-sectiol
 
of the Washington community for provocative and timely dis­
cussions. The Center is funded by annual Congressional appro­
priation and also by contributions from the private sector.
 
The Wilson Center is a unique institution in Washington; it
 
is both an ivory tower for working scholars and an intellectuz
 
crossroads, where legislators, policy makers, journalists,

business and labor executives meet to reflect on and discuss
 
important issues in an impartial way. Without a tenured
 
faculty or extended appointments, th. enter, through its six
 
programs, offers an open environment where an international
 
community of scholars can work together, transcending disci­
plines and nationalities, toward tentative answers to the
 
important questions facing the nation and the world.
 
THE EAST ASIA PROGRAM
 
In June 1980, the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson
 
International Center for Scholars approved the formal estab­
lishment of the East Asia Program for a three-year term of
 
full operation. In February 1981, the first permanent sec­
retary of the East Asia Program, Ronald A. Morse, assumed his
 
duties at the Center. The formal establishment of the East
 
Asia Program reflects the fact that East Asian studies have a
 
vital role to play at the Center and the judgment that the
 
Wilson Center can make a major contribution to the study of
 
Asia in the United States.
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PREFACE
 
Next to national defense, energy policy, with clear
 
economic and political implications, is the most critical
 
issue confronting the Republic of Korea today. While con­
siderable strides have been made in Korean energy policy,
 
economic planners still consider energy to be a major
 
limiting factor to Korea's continuing economic growth and
 
development. This paper discusses three important dimen­
sions of this argument: the role of energy in the Korean
 
economy; the nature and extent of the energy constraints
 
on the Korean economy today; and energy-economic policies
 
that could alleviate energy constraints in the future.
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ENERGY IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Following the Korean War the Republic of Korea embarked
 
upon a remarkably successful program of economic growth and
 
development. The engine of progress was export-led industri­
alization, via successive economic policies of reconstruction,
 
import substitution, and diversification. Coincident with
 
this industrialization, Korea became heavily dependent upon

imported energy sources, in particular upon imported oil.
 
Following the rapid run-up in oil prices and the corresponding
 
risk of oil supply interruptions, the Korean economy was forced
 
into a period of readjustment.
 
In 1980 domestic inflation, which was largely induced by
 
higher oil prices and a highly competitive world product ex­
port market, had brought the Korean economy to a standstill.
 
The stark reality of the Korean economy today is that it has
 
a marketable labor force and a reasonable capital base, but
 
not much else in the way of productive resources. To realize
 
its important multiple goals (national defense, economic sta­
bilization, and continued economic growth and development),
 
Korea must learn to manage its labor and capital base in the
 
most efficient and effective possible way.
 
Korea is most likely to realize its economic objectives
 
by doing well what it is already best at: industrial expan­
sion and diversification for domestic and export consumption.
 
A number of energy policies are especially appropriate to such
 
an economic strategy: adoption of state-of-the-art, energy
 
efficient equipment for all new installations, diversification
 
of energy imports by fuel type and supplier; and stimulation
 
of non-energy exports in order to generate the foreign exchange
 
necessary to pay for energy imports.
 
THE EVOLUTION OF KOREA'S ENERGY PROBLEM
 
Over 70 percent of Korea's energy comes from imported
 
energy sources. It approaches self-sufficiency only in an­
thracite production. In 1953 Korea possessed and used little
 
energy other than that of its human resources. The economy
 
was primarily agrarian, and there was little unused land that
 
could be brought into production. Coal production was low,
 
timber resources had been depleted, and hydropower had not
 
been developed. National defense and and economic survival
 
were Korea's foremost concerns.
 
During the 1950s the Korean economy made moderate pro­
gress. However, it gre; from a small base with only a per
 
-- 
--
Energy Supply Projection
 
Unit: thousand ton-oil-equivalent
 
1981 
 1986 	 1982-86
 
Average Annual
 
Growth Rate(%)
 
Petroleum 25,396 62.1 28,667 
 48.4 2.5
 
Gas 
 569 1.4 2,904 4.9 38.5
 
Anthracite 10,198 
 24.9 12,116 20.5 3.5
 
coal
 
Bituminous(l) 
 880 2.2 6,154 10.4 47.5
 
coal (4,939) (11,183)
 
Hydro 	 537 1.3 726 1.2 6.2
 
Nuclear 	 774 
 1.9 6,561 11.1 53.3
 
Fire wood & 2,516 6.2 2,070 3.5 
-3.8
 
charcoal 
Solar 
-- --	 5 
Total 	 40,871 100.0 59,203 100.0 
 7.7
 
(44,930) (64,232)
 
Note: (1) Numbers in parentheses inclade bituminous coal used for
 
steel mills.
 
Source: The 
Fifth Five.-Year Economic and Social Development Plan,

1982-1986. (Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea,
 
June 1981.)
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capita income of $100 as late as 1960. A small, import­
substitution-oriented industrial sector was established, but
 
the value of imports remained about ten times greater than the
 
value of exports throughout this period. The energy sector
 
was a relatively unimportant part of the total economy.
 
At the end of the 1950s Korea was still a net food im­
porter. The economy still relied upon concessional foreign

assistance to finance consumer and capital goods imports. Low
 
labor productivity, due to capital scarcity and the 
unre­
strained monetary and fiscal expansion of the 1950s, led to
 
low income levels and high inflation. This in turn resulted
 
in low savings and low investment levels.
 
In 1961, an economic planning policy with export promo­
tion as its key objective was introduced. The official cur­
rency -- the won -- was devalued, financial institutions were
 
reformed, and industry was given preferential interest rates
 
and tax subsidies. The effect of these policies was a drama­
tic increase in GNP, averaging 9.6 percent throughout the 1960s.
 
The energy implications of the 1961 economic policy were
 
initially very slight. However, a fundamental change occurred
 
in the nature of Korea's pattern of energy use. The major

change was in the increase of petroleum imports, primarily for
 
use 
in the expanding industrial and transportation sectors.
 
Also during the 1960s, production of anthracite* increased for
 
use 
in space heating and cooking, while oil and hydropower gen­
eration expanded.
 
Despite high levels of oil imports, Korea was in a strong

competitive economic position when the oil price shock hit in
 
1973. Through currency devaluations, expansionary fiscal pol­
icies, and import restrictions, Korea was able to defend its
 
economic position and achieve a real 1974-1975 GNP growth of
 
7.5 percent. Korea also took advantage of a large export surge

to the Middle East in 1976 and strong domestic demand in 1977
 
and 1978. The real 1976-1978 GNP growth was over 12.0 percent.

This high and prolonged economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s
 
caused profound changes in the way that Korea used energy.
 
*Anthracite, or hard coal, has a high percentage of fixed 
car­
bon and a low percentage of volatile matter. It is used for
 
space heating and, outside of Korea, for generating electri­
city. Korea's coal reserves, which are low in quality, are
 
currently adequate to supply ninety (90) percents of its coal
 
needs.
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Productivity increases in the 1960s and 1970s required

more capital and a greater use of energy. 
 The rapidly growing
industrial sector absorbed surplus labor and drove up wage

rates. The 
rise in wage rates combined with a rapid monetary

expansion to 
cause a strong inflationary bias within the econ­
omy, keeping an upward pressure on wages. The growing indus­trial sector absorbed an even higher proportion of capital and
 
energy than of labor, while the costs of capital goods and en­ergy remained relatively constant. 
 The cost of labor then was
increasing more rapidly than the cost of capital goods and the
 
energy needed to make them functional. As a rational conse­quence, the substitution of labor for capital and human energy
for energy derived from fossil fuels declined.
 
The high energy-dependent economic growth of the 1970s was
most heavily dependent on imported petroleum, and to a lesser
 
extent, imported bituminous coal. The transport and 
industrial
 
sectors relied upon modern oil-using plants and equipment. The

residential sector continued to use 
the traditional fuel, an­thracite, which was being extracted at nearly the maximum pos­
sible rate. Bituminous coal was imported for other uses.
Hydropower was being expanded at close to 
its maximum possible

rate, and Korea's new nuclear plants had 
not yet begun opera­tion. 
 Increased electric power generation had to be oil-based.
 
When the fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-81) was formulated,
it was clear that rising wages, resulting from the success of
 
Korea's economic programs and prolonged inflation, made labor­intensive industries more vulnerable to 
industrial competition
from abroad. 
 With the goals of industrialization and maximum

economic growth in mind, Korean planners made ready to phase

out the least competitive of their industries and reallocate
the necessary resources to capital-intensive industries which
produced higher valued products. The energy and transport

requirement for these industries were much greater and the
immediacy of these needs caused Korea to depend even more on
imported oil. By 1981 oil comprised 60 percent of Korea's
 
energy use.
 
Inflationary pressures within the Korean economy contin­
ued. 
 Money supply growth resulted from expansionary monetary

and fiscal policies as well as 
from large foreign exchange in­flows from the successful export program and Middle Eastern

construction contracts. 
 The effects of labor shortages began
to be felt for perhaps the first time. 
 Thus, in 1978, the
Korean government began to take steps to 
cool off the economy.
Contractionary economic policies and a second wave of oil
price increases dampened the Korean economic boom by mid-1979.
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Labor-intensive industries that were already losing 
com­
petitiveness due to rising wages were hurt the most. 
The com­
position of Korea's industrial sector became even more capital

intensive and energy-using as less competitive firms in labor­
intensive industries shut down.
 
In 1980, the GNP fell nearly 6 percent overall due to
 
decreasing domestic demand for consumables and a decline in
 
agricultural output caused by bad weather. 
 Utilization of in­
dustrial capacity fell below 70 percent and inventories grew

to almost double the 1978 year end levels. The won was de­
valued and domestic prices for petroleum products were raised
 
substantially. Korea's trade balance, excluding oil, rose
 
from a 1979 deficit of $1.1 billion to a surplus of $1 billion.
 
Oil costs caused the overall trade balance to fall into a sub­
stantial overall deficit of $1.5 billion.
 
Today, Korea has limited anthracite reserves, minimal ad­
ditional hydropower capacity, small renewable power potential,

and practically no oil or gas. Anthracite production has
 
leveled off at a maximum rate of 17-20 million tons per year

and provides only about 25 percent of Korea's current total
 
energy consumption. Very little additional hydropower capacity

could be added, although pumped storage might enhance its 
con­
tribution by a few percentage points of the total electric
 
sector output. Solar/wind/wave power is not available econom­
ically, even in small quantities. The probability of Korea
 
finding any oil or gas onshore or offshore is slight. Wood is
 
relatively abundant, but Korea prefers not to use 
its biomass
 
as an energy resource. For the foreseeable future, Korea will
 
continue to import most of its energy needs.
 
Oil and Coal in 1980
 
Oil Imports: 560,000 barrels per day
 
Oil Import Cost: $5.4 billion
 
Coal Use:
 
Domestic 18 million tons
 
Imports 4.5 million tons
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ENERGY REQUIREMENTS AS A CONSTRAINT
 
TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
 
The lack of indigenous energy resources 
coupled with a
dependence on high-priced imported energy will make Korean

economic growth and development difficult in 
the future. For
Korea to remain competitive, it must increase the productivity

of its capital- and energy-intensive industries. 
 These indus­tries have historically been, and will probably continue to
be, heavy energy users. 
 National defense also dictates the

need for more capital-intensive industries which tend to
heavy energy users. be
 But domestic political stability requires
Korea to generate jobs for about 400,000 new 
labor market
 
entrants annually. 
Thus, Korea must carefully allocate scarce

capital between the relatively higher technology, heavy energy­
using industries needed 
to be economically competitive and

militarily secure, and 
industries which 
can absorb the new mem­
bers of the labor force each year.
 
In a developing country each dollar of additional 
invest­
ment in industrialization yields a relatively high return in
increased labor productivity because capital is 
relatively

more 
scarce than labor. To the extent that high and rising

energy import bills siphon investment funds away from the in­dustrialization programs of the developi*ng country, the terms

of trade are turned against it and 
in favor of the developed

countries. 
 Thus, high energy prices have a greater negative
impact on the energy-poor developing country than on 
the
 
the energy-poor developed countries.
 
As an 
energy-poor developing and industrializing country,
Korea must expand the value of 
its industrial exports suffi­
ciently to offset high and rising energy import bills. 
 Other­
wise these energy import bills will reduce funds available to
finance industrialization and, 
without continuing rapid indus­trial expansion and diversification, Korea will find it 
increas­ingly difficult to 
develop new export markets.
 
It is readily apparent that higher energy import bills
have severely and directly constrained the export-led Korean
 
economy. 
 This problem is most evident in the fact that Korean's
formerly favorable balance of 
trade has disappeared. In the

absence of surplus export earnings, the Korean economy stalled
despite continued high domestic savings levels. 
 It became
 
necessary to use export earnings to pay for higher energy costs.
Higher energy bills crowded out necessary industrial base in­
vestment. 
Thus, much of Korea's future economic base is being

dissipated to pay for enlarged energy import bills.
 
As higher energy import expenditures have crowded out in­dustrial 
investment and reduced labor productivity, they have
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also caused a decline in the real income of wage 
earners.
 
Higher energy prices have increased the cost of goods and 
ser­
vices throughout the Korean economy. To compensate for the
 
higher cost of living, labor has sought and will continue to
 
seek wage increases. To the extent that labor has been suc­
cessful in offsetting higher living 
costs with higher incomes,

Korean labor productivity has declined and the 
terms of trade
 
have deteriorated further. To the extent that the work force
 
is not successful in maintaining or improving its standard of
 
living, there is less incentive to improve labor productivity.

Thus, there is no easy way for Korea to combat inflation ex­
cept by increased earnings from abroad.
 
The deterioration of Korea's 
terms of trade has been evi­
dent in the continuing pressure to devalue the won. Devalua­
tion of the won lowered the price of Korean exports and helped

stimulate foreign demand for Korean imports. 
 The devalued won
 
also has meant higher prices for Korean imports, including pri­
mary materials and capital goods that 
are essential to Korea's
 
indusrializing economy. But, relatively higher prices for es­
sential imports, other than for energy, are a further source
 
of inflation.
 
The problem of inflation is worsened because the higher
 
energy import bill impacts are not spread evenly throughout

the economy. Generally, the heaviest energy-using economic
 
activities in Korea have been impacted most severely. 
The in­
dustrial sector, which is essential to increased foreign ex­
change earnings, has been affected most. 
The construction and
 
transportation sectors, which are essential to 
support the in-­
dustrial sector, have also been strongly impaired.
 
Finally, as if the foregoing energy-related problems
 
were 
not enough, the necessity of maintaining a strong defense
 
posture makes the energy supply issue 
into an especially
 
onerous economic problem. Korea continues to face the serious
 
problem of 
an energy supply cutoff or disruption that could
 
make the country vulnerable in the event of outside invasion.
 
The financing of strategic energy stockpiles and energy import

diversification means 
that funds must be spent upon essentially

non-productive assets. These non-productive expenditures

further erode Korea's ability to compete in export markets.
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Percent of Energy Demand by Sector
 
1978 2008
 
Industry 
 35 44
 
Residential/Commercial 
 38 26
 
Transportation 
 11 18
 
Public Sector 
 12 12
 
ENERGY POLICY OPTIONS
 
There are a number of energy policy options that Korea
has implemented 
or could initiate to mitigate the recent nega­tive economic impact of higher energy import bills and 
to re­duce energy import vulnerability. In evaluating these options,
it is necessary to consider each of them within the context of

the complex interrelations between the energy 
sector and the
 
economy as a whole. 
 It is also important to recognize that
 
most of 
these options require a substantial diversion of 
scarce
 
capital away from other uses 
and fiture industrial production
 
is reduced.
 
The most obvious energy policy option is 
to offset high

energy bills through conservation 

-- by using less energy.

Korea has already implemented a comprehensive energy conser­
vation program and has already realized much of the potential

to save energy through eliminating waste. Korea also has
taken steps 
to improve the energy efficiency of its energy

processing, transport and 
conversion technologies. The Korean
 
energy systems technology is modern, and the replacement of
 
most existing equipment with more energy-efficient equipment

would not yield significant energy savings. 
 In this situation,

micro-level efforts 
to enforce current conservation rules or
 to identify additional 
areas of waste could result in some

additional savings, but additional broad brush policies to
improve the energy efficiency of the existing Korean energy

system will not prove very effective.
 
In terms of Korea's future energy system, energy conser­
vation policies could play a more significant role in reducing

oil import bills. Present plans are to reduce energy 
use by

5 percent by 1983 and 15 percent by the end of 
the century.
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If Korea can sustain a high rate of economic growth and de­
velopment, it will have 
an excellent opportunity to install
 
state-of-the-art technologies that provide maximum energy

savings at l-ttle or no extra capital cost. To the extent
 
that Korea's continued rapid economic progress is based upon

industrialization, construction or other energy-using activi­
ties, it can realize an additional comparative advantage by

becoming more energy efficient than its export market compet­
itors. In view of the potentially large energy savings that
 
could result from the adaptation of the best new energy con­
servation technologies, Korea's energy conservation efforts
 
will be most productive if they are forward looking. The best
 
energy policies in this regard will be 
those that draw atten­
tion to these 
important energy savings and advantages. One
 
of the best ways to accomplish energy conservation is to pro­
vide 
economic incentives to local manufacturers and importers

who develop cr import the most energy-efficient technologies.

Tax or tariff rebates come to mind as an efficient way to
 
provide the appropriate incentives 
to adapt energy-efficient
 
plants and equipment.
 
It is sometimes suggested that Korea could best pursue

energy conservation by restructuring its economy to concen­
trate on activities which use less energy. 
 This redirection
 
of the economy could result in energy savings, but it is un­
realistic for Korea to 
do this for two reasons: first, such
 
a policy would put Korea in competition with less developed

countries which have cheaper labor and, 
in labor-intensive
 
industries, lower overall production costs. 
 Second, this
 
would detract from and, perhaps, severely impair the further
 
development of the industrial base Korea requires to meet its
 
national defense needs.
 
To 
some extent, Korea may be able to substitute non­
energy-intensive technology and light industry for the heavy

industrialization of the past. However, since Korea will ex­
perience intense competition in these markets from the highly

skilled labor of other rapidly industrializing countries, its
 
relatively high and rising wages may price its labor and pro­duction out of flany export markets. It will also be some years

before Korea's domestic R&D infrastructure expands to the point

where it can substantially increase export revenues.
 
A better way to direct Korea's economy is to earn the
 
foreign exchange needed 
to pay for energy imports. This could
 
be accomplished best by promoting exports in 
the industrial
 
and high technology areas where Korea has 
a clear comparative

advantage. Korea is 
one ot a very few middle-income industri­
alizing countries that is in a position to 
compete with seg­
ments of the developed world. Korea's recent success 
in
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achieving a world competitive steel industry gives some

of what might be accomplished in the future. 
idea
 
Bounties or

awards to successful exporters could serve to stimulate free
 
market competition and sales abroad. 
A policy of this type

would allocate import licenses or 
foreign exchange rights on
 
the basis of export successes.
 
The energy policy options discussed thus far do not ad­dress directly the problem of providing a secure energy supply.

The use of less energy throughout the economy, 
or the develop­
ment of a strong export base that 
can pay for needed energy,

certainly could improve the overall energy supply situation
 
but would not substantially reduce vulnerability to 
an oil
 
supply cut-off. 
 For this reason, the stockpiling of strategic

energy supplies and an 
active energy import diversification
 
program may also be 
needed. The government hopes to have 
a
 
60-day stockpile of 
oil by the mid-1980s. Among the options

to 
stockpile energy, the Korean government should consider
 
working with the private sector to 
increase storage facilities

throughout the energy system. 
Also, attention should be di­
rected toward the acquisition of different fuels from different
 
suppliers. Another option is 
the massive nuclear power develop­
ment program under consideration. 
By 1990 the Korean government

plans to be generating 15 
percent of the nation's total energy

need through nuclear reactors and hopes to have as many as
 
forty large nuclear generating plants operating early in the
 
21st century. The most cost effective energy security options
 
are 
those that aEfect the future expansion of the Korean energy

system rather than those that redirect the exisiting energy
 
system.
 
Ultimately, Korea must fully develop a 
composite of these

and other possible energy policy options. No one energy pol­
icy by itself is likely to resolve all or 
even most of Korea's
 
energy problem. 
Therefore, it also is appropriate to consider
 
new measures 
that could help forge the foregoing diverse poli­
cies into a more comprehensive energy policy program. 
Bilat­
eral trade agreements may be 
a good approach to developing ex­port markets for Korean goods 
and services while insuring safe
 
and diversified sources 
for energy imports. Bilateral agree­
ments have been used advantageously by Korea in 
the past and
 
should be developed by Korea in the future. 
 Similarly, the
 
Government of Korea and private enterprise can 
further stimu­late joint energy ventures with countries and companies abroad.
 
In any case, it is essential that the Korean economy be open
 
to 
foreign investors or exporters.
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Korea realized the miracle of rapid eocnomic growth and
 
development because it was an open economy. To turn away
 
from that successful formula in the face of the energy problem
 
would be a grave mistake.
 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
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GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
By Sector 
(Billions of Korean Won at Constant 1975 Prices) 
GNP* Agriculture Mining GManufacturing Construction Electricity,Gas & Water Transportatlon& Communicationv 
1950 1739.6 
1955 2422.6 1178.1 24.6 119.7 39.8 4.1 28.2 
1960 2845.6 1256.7 49.4 192.4 58.2 8.1 54.5 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
3885.0 
4378.5 
4669.4 
5195.6 
5911.4 
6347.7 
6908.7 
7305.0 
8377.1 
9009.4 
9644.2 
1101.6.4 
12175.2 
1661.0 
1853.7 
1744.3 
1767.0 
1952.5 
1911.5 
1951.6 
1982.9 
2086.0 
2194.5 
2302.0 
2467.7 
2524.5 
82.3 
86.2 
96.1 
94.6 
93.3 
108.8 
109.9 
108.6 
129.2 
137.1 
153.9 
157.6 
176.2 
343.7 
403.1 
490.2 
623.5 
758.2 
909.1 
1080.0 
1231.2 
1590.6 
1842.0 
2074.0 
2542.8 
2908.9 
116.4 
140.7 
167.8 
232.5 
319.8 
335.8 
328.4 
324.8 
416.4 
427.3 
486.6 
546.5 
684.2 
16.7 
19.8 
25.4 
31.6 
41.0 
48.9 
58.2 
65.3 
79.6 
90.3 
107.6 
127.3 
147.1 
103.1 
128.4 
156.9 
205.2 
259.0 
308.2 
343.4 
377.0 
476.9 
511.7 
571.1 
670.5 
791.8 
The difference between GNP and the sum for the sectors equals (Net indirect taxes) + (Factor payments to abroad 
(net))
 
Source: 
 World Bank, World Tables, Second Edition (1980)
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Total Anthracite 
Production Totn1 
KOREAN ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 
(015 Joules) 
Agriculture Mining and
and Fishing Manunc t r i ng Transportation Services Residentlin 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
231.8 
239.1 
231.9 
253.8 
285.4 
329.0 
307.2 
322.9 
337.6 
340.5 
821.0 
859.0 
969.0 
963.0 
1011.0 
1105.0 
1222.0 
1369.0 
49.0 
52.0 
70.0 
67.0 
66.0 
73.0 
80.0 
"88.0 
221.0 
232.0 
296.0 
292.0 
353.0 
402.0 
450.0 
541.0 
95.0 
101.0 
140.0 
137.0 
11.3.0 
123.0 
135.0 
158.0 
168.0 
178.0 
155.0 
152.0 
148.0 
159.0 
180.0 
195.0 
287.0 
296.0 
308.0 
315.0 
330.0 
347.0 
:177.0 
387.0 
Source: Finocchi, R; Exhibit 2.5 in Hagler, Bailly & Co., "Fossil Energy Evaluation of the Republic of Korea";U.S./ROK Cooperative Energy Assessment, U.S. Dept. of Energy (1980). 
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
 
IMPORTS A9D EXPORTS
 
(Billions of Korean Won 
nt Constant 1975 Prices)
 
Imports of 
Goods and N.F.S. 
Exports of 
Goods and N.F.S. (Exports-Imports) 
(Exports-Imports) 
GNP 
1950 262.6 38.7 
- 223.9 
- 0.129 
1955 317.8 36.3 
- 281.5 
- 0.116 
1960 348.6 77.2 
- 271.4 
- 0.095 
1.965 
1966 
1.967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
459.0 
717.0 
937.7 
1346.4 
1704.6 
1841.6 
2229.2 
2256.2 
3087.9 
3604.5 
3612.6 
4582.6 
5673.8 
221.4 
315.2 
418.3 
583.5 
794.2 
949.7 
1143.5 
1565.4 
2432.3 
2357.0 
2748.4 
3931.5 
4941.9 
- 237.6 
- 401.8 
- 519.4 
- 762.9 
- 910.4 
- 891.9 
- 1085.7 
- 690.8 
- 655.6 
- 1247.5 
- 864.2 
- 651.1 
- 731.9 
- 0.061. 
- 0.092 
- 0.11. 
- 0.147 
- 0.154 
- 0.141 
- 0.157 
- 0.095 
- 0.078 
- 0.138 
- 0.090 
- 0.059 
- 0.060 
Source: World Bank, World Tables, Second Edition (1980) 
Food, 
Beverages 
1960 40.2 
1965 16.7 
1970 9.6 
1977 10.6 
Source: World Bank 
Food, 
Beverages 
1960 12.5 
1965 15.1 
1970 17.1 
1977 8.2 
Nonfood 

Agriculture 

16.0 

8.5 

7.0. 

2.2 

Nonfood 

Agriculture 

20.9 

22.2 

15.4 

13.6 

REPUBLIC OF KOREA 

STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
 
IMPORTS
 
(Percenut of Total)
 
Fuels, Machinery
 
Minerals 
 and 

and Metals Equipment 

24.4 
 2.6 

15.4 
 3.1 

6.7 
 7.4 

2.3 17.4 

EXPORTS
 
(Percent of Total)
 
Non-fuel Machinery
 
Minerals 
 and 

and Metals Equipment 

1.7 16.5 

4.2 13.3 

5.7 29.7 

5.6 
 26.9 

Other
 
Manufacturers 

16.7 

56.3 

69.4 

67.6 

Other 

Manufacturers 

41.1 

38.3 

25.0 

25.5 

15
 
Total
 
100
 
100
 
100
 
100
 
Fuels and
 
Lubricants Total
 
7.3 100 
6.9 100 
6.9 100 
20.2 100 
Source: 
 World Bank, World Tables, Second Edition (1980)
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
 
BALANCES OF TRADE AND PAYMENTS 
(Millions of Current $ U.S.) 
Balance of Current Balance
 
Trade of Payments
 
1970 
- 922.0 
- 623.0 
1971 
- 1046.0 
- 848.0 
1972 
- 575.0 
- 371.0 
1973 
- 567.0 
- 309.0 
1974 
- 1937.0 
- 2023.0 
1975 

- 1671.0 

- 1887.0
 
1976 

- 591.0 

- 314.0
 
1977 

- 477.0 
 + 12.0
 
1978 

- 1781.0 

- 1085.0
 
1979 

- 4565.0 

- 4239.0
 
Source: 	 Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea, Handbook of the
 
Korean Economy
 
